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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ALICE KESLER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

No. 15520

DAVID 0. KESLER, Trustee of
the Estate of Alice Kesler;
DAVID o. KESLER, an individual, and HELEN KESLER, his
wife,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
In this matter, Alice Kesler, the Plaintiff-Appellant,
and the mother of David Kesler, the Defendant-Respondent,
seeks a judgment from the above entitled Court declaring the
document marked Exhibit No. P-3, entitled "Warranty Deed",
invalid, said document purporting to convey a joint tenant
interest in real property from the Plaintiff-Appellant Alice
Kesler to the Defendant-Respondent David Kesler.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to reverse that portion of the lower
court's verdict wherein said couit held valid the joint
tenancy deed.

The judgment involved in the remainder of
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the case covering the property left in the revocable trust
was stipulated to.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Alice Kesler, age 85, in the summer of 1971, hired
Eldon Eliason, attorney at law, to prepare a revocable
trust for her, naming Alice's son David Kesler as Trustee
in Trust of said Revocable Trust.

Pursuant to the Trust

prepared by Eliason, Alice deeded certain real property to
her son David in trust as her Trustee.

On September 20,

1971, Mr. Eliason, while still acting as Alice's attorney,
prepared a Statement of Withdrawal purporting to withdraw
certain properties from the Trust, the same to be executed
by Alice.

Said Statement of Withdrawal included, however,

an additional 640 acres which was never a part of the trust
property.

Alice's testimony indicates that her signature

appears on the Withdrawal, but that she has no recollection
of signing the same, or of instructing either her Trustee
David Kesler or Eldon Eliason, her attorney, to prepare
the Statement of Withdrawal.

The property in the State-

ment of Withdrawal includes Alice's home and two rental
units, all located in Fillmore, Utah, as well as 640 acres
of grazing ground located West of Cove Fort, Utah, about
40 miles south of Fillmore.
On the same date, to-wit: September 20, 1971, Eliason,
while still acting as attorney for the said Alice Kesler,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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did prepare a Quit Claim Deed conveying the same property
included in the Statement of Withdrawal with the exception
of the 640 acres, from David Kesler as Trustee, to Alice
Kesler, Settlor, his mother.

David claimed at the trial

to have no knowledge of the facts surrounding the preparation of the Withdrawal or the Quit Claim Deed, but admits
executing the Quit Claim Deed and had custody of it at
the time of trial. David further stated with regard to both
documents that he did not give Eliason any instructions
with regard to the preparation of the same, and Eldon
Eliason could not recall whether his instructions came
from Alice Kesler or David Kesler, but thought that they
came from both.

Alice denied giving Eliason any instruc-

tions regarding the transaction.
On the 5th day of October, 1971, after the withdrawal,
Alice wrote a letter to David asking that her Fillmore property be withdrawn from the Trust.

Alice says that she does

not recall writing said letter, but did indicate that the
same might have been dictated to her by someone else, but
was reluctant to tell the court the name of the person who
dictated the letter.

It is interesting to note that the

letter requesting the property to be

withdrawn from the

Trust was written some 15 days after the execution of the
Statement of Withdrawal, withdrawing the property from the
Trust, and the Quit Claim Deed transferring the property
f~om

Trustee David Kesler to Settlor, Alice Kesler.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In July, 1972, Alice Kesler, while David Kesler was
acting as her Trustee in Trust and while Eliason was still
Alice's attorney, prepared a Will while the Trust was still
in effect.

Said Will, pursuant to Paragraph 4, Subparagraph

5, Page 3, gives the bulk of her property to David Kesler,
her Trustee in Trust, and does not comply with the terms
as set forth in the Trust Agreement (See Exhibit D-9, and
Exhibit P-1).
In August, 1972, Alice Kesler and David Kesler as
Trustee in Trust for Alice Kesler, commenced an action
against Joseph Kesler and Calvin Kesler, two of the other
children of Alice Kesler and Otto Kesler, to recover possession cf certain real porperty from Joseph and Calvin
Kesler located near Cove Fort, Utah.

Said lawsuit was

partially consummated and Alice Kesler was given possession and ownership of said property in question on the
6th day of March, 1973.

Shortly thereafter, on or about

the 9th day of March, 1973, a Warranty Deed was prepared
by Fred F. Finlinson, attorney at law, conveying all of
the property covered by the Statement of Withdrawal referred to heretofore herein and marked as Exhibit P-4, from
Alice T. Kesler to Alice T. Kesler and David O. Kesler,
Grantees as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship, and not as tenants in common.

This deed was also

!!lade and prepared by Mr. Finlinson while David Kesler was
acting as Trustee in Trust for Alice Kesler.

The testimony
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surrounding the Warranty Deed is to the effect that David
and Alice went first to Eldon Eliason to have him prepare
such a document, but Mr. Eliason felt that he should not
prepare such a document for fear that he would be criticized
because of a conflict of interest.

He testified further that
q

he though there might be something wrong with him preparing
such a deed because he purportedly represented Alice Kesler
in the preparation of the Trust, but also felt an cbligation
to David Kesler as Trustee of the Trust, and therefor, Eliason
declined to prepare the deed and he further testified that
he refused to give any legal advice with regard to the effeet of such a Warranty Deed.
After Mr. Eliason declined to give any advice or
represent Alice or David with regard to the preparation
of the purported Warranty Deed, David and Alice journeyed
to Salt Lake City to converse with Mr. Fred Finlinson, the
attorney who subsequently prepared the deed in question.
Mr. Eliason, while not being willing to aid Alice or
David in any way in the preparation of the Warranty Deed,
also indicated by his testimony that he did not refer them
to any particular attorney, yet they ended up in the law
offices of the said Finlinson whose signature appears on
the original Complaint in the action in the lower court
entitled "Alice Kesler and David Kesler, Trustee, vs.
Joseph Kesler ar.d Calvin Kesler", bearing the Civil No. 6120.
Finlinson, however, denied ever putting his signature on the
Sponsored byor
the S.J.
Quinney Law Library.
provided
by theattorney
Institute of Museum and
Library Services
Complaint,
knowing
itFunding
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said that if Finlinson's signature appeared on the Complaint
in question, that Eliason signed the same with Finlinson's
permission.

In any event, there was some connection, if

not a close connection with regard to the matters involving
the Keslers and Finlinson and Eliason.

Finlinson further

testified that he was familiar with Alice and David's case
against Joe and Calvin.

Finlinson testified that he ad-

vised both Alice and David Kesler generally as to what a
joint tenancy deed was, but when asked specifically what
he told them, he could not recall.

In answer to the ques-

tion as to whether or not he told Alice Kesler with regard
to the deed in question that she could never revoke it or
recover her property, he said that he had no recollection
of the question ever being covered, that it never came up,
nor was it ever discussed.

He also indicated that there

was no discussion with regard to a Will, nor did he give
her any advice relating to life estates, nor was there any
discussion with regard to the same.

David Kesler had no

recollection of what was said with regard to the joint tenancy
deed, except he concluded that Mr. Finlinson was a thorough
man and that he gave a good explanation of the effect of a
joint tenancy deed.

Mrs. Kesler testified that she had no

recollection of executing any document in Finlinson's office, but stated that she went there to discuss the results
of her case with Joe and Calvin, the same having been finalized just two days before the preparation of the Warranty
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Deed in question, and she further testified that it was
her concern to know whether or not the joint tenancy
created between her and her husband, Otto Kesler, was
valid as determined by the lower court herein and whether
or not the same would hold up .:i.gainst Joe and Calvin's
claim on the property at Cove Fort on appeal.
The only notes that Mr. Finlinson made with regard
to the transaction are found on

~he

bottom of a copy of

the Warranty Deed in question, which David's attorney
submitted as evidence to the lower court and the notes
are quoted as follows:
"Mrs. Kesler and Dave came in and reported the
Judge's decision and Mrs.

Kesler expressed her deter-

mination that Joe and Calvin may receive nothiag."
(See Exhibit D-8)

(emphasis added)

Alice further testified that she told her son David
that she wanted him to have her home in Fillmore (not
the 640 acres located near Cove Fort or the rental property
or the vacant lot in Fillmore) described in the Warranty
Deed, after her death, and not before.

She further stated

that she wanted a Will, and talked to David Kesler about
a Will.

She said that she loved and trusted David, and

chose him as her Trustee in Trust because she loved him
and trusted him, and that he
felt that she could trust.

W?S

the only one that she

She further testified that she

would have signed anything that David put before her, while
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he was acting as her Trustee, and that David did at times
bring certain documents to her home in Fillmore for her
signature and that if, in fact, she signed the document entitled Warranty Deed that the

title was covered up and

she thought she was signing a Will.
She was very emphatic in stating that she never intended that David have anything before her death.

David

also testified that she tcld him she wanted him to have her
home located in Fillmore after her death, that David was
the only one that said he liked the arrangement and the
floor plan and that because he said he liked it, she wanted
him to have it.

David's testimony clearly indicates that

the only property that was ever discussed between David
and Alice with regard to David having the same after the
death of Alice, was her home in Fillmore.
The evidence clearly showed without contradiction
that

Ali~e

personally paid from her own funds, all of the

real property taxes, personal property taxes, maintenance,
repairs, remodeling (furnace and roof), painting, etc. on
the rental units.

David never paid one penny for any of

the aforementioned items.

The best testimony that David

could come up with was to say that one time he hauled a
load of trash to the dump for his mother, using his mother's
pickup which she gave him at a cost, according to David's
own testimony, of approximately $4,000.00.
Alice Kesler testified that all of the proceeds
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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received as rent from the rental units were put in her bank
account and she spent the money the way that she wanted to.
She further testified that the money was hers earned from
l1er rental units which she bought and paid fer, along with
Otto Kesler, and David had no right to any of the money.
David agreed to all of these facts in this paragraph and
the foregoing one.

David Kesler further testified that

he never reported any .income :?:eceived by him on his Federal
or State Income Tax Return after the purported Warranty
Deed was made purportedly con'leying a one-half interest in
the property to him.

David f'.lrther testified that he did

not cause to be filed or advise Alice to file as her Trustee
in Trust for her, a gift tax return when he obtained the
purported Warranty Deed from Alice.

Alice further stated

and David agreed, that Alice had a right to mortgage or
sell the property if she so desired and keep all of the
proceeds received therefrom without consulting David.
In fact, a sale was consummated on one of Alice's vacant
lots located in Fillmore, and the proceeds derived therefrom were deposited to the account of Alice Kesler.

The

money, however, had to be paid back to the purchaser because Alice could not deliver clear title to the vacant
lot because it was tied up by her other two sons, Joe and
Calvin.
The question way put directly tb David Kesler as
follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"Q:

Have you ever paid any taxes on any of these

properties covered in this Warranty Deed (P-3) ."

(emphasis

added)
David's answer was as follows:
"A:

Mama has always paid her own taxes on her

property."

(emphasis added)

Mother testified unequivocally that she thought she
was signing a Will willing her home in Fillmore to David
(Not

the 640 acres in Cove Fort or the rental units, or

the vacant lots in Fillmore) , which David was not to get,
but which was included in the purported Warranty Deed
(Exhibit P-3) , and that the Will which Alice thought she
had signed was not to be recorded until after Alice's
death.

She further testified that it was her intent that

David have her home in Fillmore not immediately, but after
her death.
David's testimony indicated that he paid nothing for
the real property, but that mother told him that he had
not received as much a.s the others, so he should get more
after her death, yet the evidence-s__hows as given by David,
'

/

that he received an

"'\

$11,000.00~wat~~ and bailer, and a

$4,000.00 pickup truck in the spring and summer of 1973,
while acting as Alice's Trustee.

David said he felt that

he had some rights in the property, but he certainly did
not intend by his testimony to exert such rights until
after his mother's death.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Reference is made to Exhibit D-7, which further illustrates and supports Alice's testimony that she did not intend to give David any present interest in her properties
in Fillmore or Cove Fort, until after her death, where she
states the following:
"At this time I would like all my Fillmore property
taken out of the trust.

I want you to receive this proper-

ty after my death, to use the income of or sale of, as
you see fit.

I am trusting you . . . " (emphasis added)

D-10 was also introduced by the defense to show
Alice'5 intent, and reference is specifically made to
that part which the defense relies upon located on Page
4 of said D-10, wherein Alice states that:
"We went to all that expense of building the museum
and Mary and LeGrande and the boys and their wives got
the whole. benefit.

Never have ycu (David) had a break

with the others, but earned it the hard way."
It is clear from the letter that the "we" which she
refers to in building up the museum, was Alice and Otto,
her husband, and not Alice and David, because David never
did anything to help build up Cove Fort.

He left the

Fillmore area in 1946 for Montana, and has been there continually ever since, with the exception of his purported
numerous trips from Montana to Fillmore to help his mother.
ARGUMENT
Point I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEREIN IT DECLARED THAT JOINT
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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TENANCY WARRANTY DEED WAS VALID.
There are various and numerous requirements wnich
affect the validity of a deed.

The law covered herein,

however, relates only to those legal points pertinent
to the facts in question which affect the validity of
P-3, the purported Warranty Deed.
One of the prime requisites required to make a deed
valid, is delivery, and delivery must be determined by
the intent of the Granter, taking into consideration all
of the surrounding facts relating to said deed and the
preparation thereof.

The

mere fact that a deed is

prepared and executed by the Granter and found to be in
the hands of the Grantee, does not in and of itself,
constitute a valid delivery.

To make the delivery of a

deed valid, the Granter must intend to transfer to the
Grantee, irrevocable possession, actual or constructive,
of the instrument in question, and the Granter must also
intend that an immediate conveyance of title to the
Grantee be made according to the tenor of the instrument.
The important element in all cases of delivery is the
intention of the Granter and since the intention of the
Granter is entireley a subjective matter, it must be
determined by any and all indicia that may logically appear
to bear upon it, and in all cases, there can be no passage
of title to the Grantee

witho~t

a valid legal delivery.

Other circumstances which make the delivery of a deed
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invalid which might otherwise be valid, is a mistake on the
part of the Grantor, and such a mistake may be unilateral
in nature.

Fraud may also nullify the delivery of a deed

which may otherwise be valid and the fraud may consist of
misrepresentation as to the nature of the document being
signed, overreaching, and taking advantage of older persons,
family members or confidential relationships.
Undue influence may affect the delivery of a deed.
The nature of such undue influence which is exercised by
the Grantee that nullifies the delivery may be the same
as that which would serve to invalidate a Will.

That is,

the passage of the deed into the Grantee's possession is
not the result of the real intention of the Granter, but
of the actions of the Grantee which have in effect imposed his own will on the Granter with the result that the
apparent delivery is rendered invalid in limine.
A benefit received by a Grantee who stands in a confidential relationship with the Granter, is presumed to be
the result of fraud and undue influence, and hence invalid.
In most jurisdictions, when this occurs, the burden
shifts from the Grantor to the Grantee to prove the fairness and good faith of the transaction.

There is obviously

no presumption in favor of a Grantee in possession of a
document
th~re

entitled Warranty Deed of a valid delivery where

is a confidential relationship, to-wit: a son and an

aged mother, plus the added fact of a fiduciary relationship
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to-wit: a sen acting as trustee of an aged mother's estate.
We have in this case, before the Court, one of the
most common of all conditional deliveries, to-wit:
death of the Grantor, as condition of possession and
delivery.

The Grantor here gave possession of the document

which is entitled Warranty Deed to the Grantee, with the
intent that any and all rights of the Grantee to the
occupancy, possession, right to rents, obligation for
taxes, and title to the property be deferred until after
the death of the Grantor.

In such cases the criteria

for determining whether or not there has been a legal delivery is the intention of the Grantor to convey to the
Grantee, a present estate in the property during the
Grantor's lifetime, regardless of the fact of physical
possession of the deed, if it is the Grantor's intention
the document made shall not operate to convey any present
estate to the Grantee until after Grantor's death, the
deed is held in every case to be ambulatory and testamentary in character and hence invalid for want of execution
as required by the applicable statute of Wills.
Such facts as occupancy, possesion and acts of dominion
over the real property become important where the question
has arised as to the Grantor's intention
of the deed.

to make a delivery

Certainly such acts performed by the Grantor

are evidence of ownership of the property and hence give
rise to an inference of non-delivery in the instant case.
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23 Am.Jur. 2d Sec. 6, p. 82, states as follows:
"Whether an instrument is a deed or will depends
primarily upon its operation, and not '.lpon its
form or manner of execution. The essential characteristic of a testamentary instrument is that
it operates only upon and by reason of the death
of the maker; during his lifetime it is ambulatory and revocable.
Hence, the maker by its execution parts with no right and divests himself of
no modicum of his estate.
It is fundamental, on
the other hand, in order that an instrument may be
operative as a deed, that it pass a present interest, although it is not necessar_y_!_hat the
grantee take a present estate in the property conveyed," (emphasis added)
and further in 23 Am.Jur. 2d Sec. 81, p. 133, it states
that:
"The intention of the parties is an essential
and controlling element of delivery of a deed.
Intention has been called the 'essence of delivery'
and not only is it often the determining factor
among other facts and circumstances, but is
the crucial test where constructive delivery is
relied upon.
Categorically stated, the rule is
that it is essential to the delivery of a deed
that there be a giving of the deed by the grantor
and a receiving of it by the grantee, with a
mutual intention to pass the title from the one
to the other. .
" (emphasis added)
and in 23 Am.Jur. 2d Sec. 82, p. 134, it further states
that:
"The intention of the grantor that bears significiantly on the question of deliverv is his intention with respect to vestin; the legal title
of the land in the grantee.
To be valid and
effective, the act of deliverv of a deed must
be accompanied by the intent that it shall become presently operative as such and presently pass
title. . .
Therefore, the inquiry is simplified by asking,
did the grantor intend the property to pass? . .
(emphasis added)
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23 Am.Jur. 2d Sec. 83, p. 135, continues as follows:
"Since the intent of the grantor is a paramount
consideration on the question of the delivery of
a deed, a delivery which will pass title occurs
only when the grantor parts with his dominion
over the deed with the intention to pass title."
(emphasis added)
In Gilbert v. Mcspadden,

(Tex. Civ. App.)

91 SW 2d

889, the court stated that:
"In order to constitute a delivery of a deed,
the facts and circumstances in evidence must
show an intention on the part of the granter that
the deed shall presently become operative and
effective . . . . " (emphasis added)
It is further stated in 23 Am.Jur. 2d Sec. 88, p. 1,
that:
"In most cases, . . . delivery is to be inferred
from circumstances which by their very nature are
equivocal and depend upon the subjective state of
mind of the arantor.
In such cases delivery becomes
a question of fact and cannot be determined as a
matter of law. This may be true even where the
deed is placed in the actual possession of the
grantee. Where the question of delivery is dependent entirely upon intention, it is to be deter~ined from all of the evidence bearing upon the
issue, including the conduct of the parties.
The
questions whether the requisite intent to make
delivery existed, and whether the granter executed
his intention to pass title by a sufficient delivery
are both questions of fact . . . " (emphasis added)
23 Am.Jur. 2d Sec. 89, p. 138, further states that:
"A sufficient delivery of a deed requires that
there be a manifestation of the intention of
the grantor to relinquish all dominion and
control over the instrument and to have it become presently effective as a transfer of title
. . . if he (the grantor) does not evidence an
intention to part presently and unconditionally
with the deed (and title to the property), there
is no delivery." (emphasis added)
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23 Am.Jur. 2d, Sec. 91, p. 141, states that:
"It is clear that if the granter hands the deed
to the grantee pe:::-sonally, W"ithout sayir.g or
doing anything to qualify the significance of such
act, an effective delivery is made.
Such direct
change of physical custody with intent to deliver
has been called 'absolute delivery'.
It is
equally clear, however, that such tranilirof the
possession of the deed from the granter to the
grantee must be made with the intention of passing title.
." (emphasis added)
23 Am.Jur. 2d, Sec. 100, p. 150, states that:
"If a deed is executed for delivery only after
the grantor's death, it is merely a will regardless of its name and is valid only when executed
in the form and manner provided by law for the
execution of wills. And this is true even when
physical possession of the deed has been surrendered to the grantee, if the grantor did not presently intend to part with the control thereof
so as to divest himself absolutely of the title."
(emphasis added)
In Henneberry v. Henneberry, 164 Cal. App. 2d
125, 330 P.2d 250, the court stated that:
"Even if a deed is manually delivered, but the
evidence shows that the parties or the granter
intended the document to become operati•1e only
upon death, it is testamentary in character,
and void as a deed."
23 Am.Jur. 2d Sec. 105, p. 156, states that:
"Not only must the granter have intended to put
reclamation of the deed beyond his power, but
alsc, technically at least, he must have intended that title to the property immediately
pass to the grantee .
. . . the issue may be stated as being: Did the
granter intend to divest himself of his prop~rty
and to give immediately to the grantee the right
ta the fee?" (emphasis added)
23 Am.Jur.

2d Sec. 109, p. 159, further states that:
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"The controllina factor is the intention of the
parties, especially the granter, to make delivery,
and this intention may be inferred from their words
and acts and from the circumstances preceding,
attending, and subsequent to the execution of the
instrument." (emphasis added}
23 Arn.Jur. 2d Sec. 118, p. 166, further states that:
"The conduct of both the granter and grantee
showing exercise of, or failure to exercise,
ownership and control of the deeded j)roperty,
also may be indicative of the grantor's intent
with respect to delivery.
The fact that the
granter continues to exercise acts of ownership and authoritv over the premises, such as the
collection of rents and profits, or the sale er
attempted sale of a portion thereof, is inconsistent with the theory of an intentional delivery,
operative and effectual to pass title." (emphasis
added}
In Martinez v. Archuleta, 64 NM 196, 326 P.2d 1082,
the court said that:
"Where the granter retains possession and control
of the property described in a deed intending
that there i:Je no delivery thereof until after his
death, the facts that grantee had possession of
the deed and had procured its recordation do not
establish <::hat title passed to him." (emphasis
added)
POINT II
EFFECT OF FRAUD UPON THE VALIDITY OF A DEED.
23 Arn.Jur. 2d, Sec. 142, p. 189, has the following to
say with regard to frauds effect on the validity of a deed:
" . . . fraud may be presumed from
a principal to his general agent,
and management of all his affairs
confidential adviser and friend."

a conveyance by
who has control
and is his
(emphasis added}

POINT III
THE EFFECT OF UNDUE INFLUENCE ON THE VALIDITY OF A DEED.
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Undue influence is a difficult term to define, and
the determination of undue influence depends upon the
circumscances of the particular case and therefore makes
any precise definition difficult.
In Vol. 23 Arn.Jur. 2d Sec. 148, p. 193-194, it states
thac:
"Undue influence has been referred to as a species
of constructive fraud which the courts will not
undertake to define by any fixed principles lest
the very definition itself should furnish a
guide to the path by which its consequences may
be evaded. Whether improper influence was exercised must usually be inferred from the facts and
circumstances of the particular case, such as the
situation of the grantor and his relation to
others, his condition of health and its effect
upon body and mind, his dependence upon, and subjection to, the persons claimed to have influenced
him, and their opportunity to wield such influence."
(emphasis added)
In Pitts v. Hawkins, 264 Ala, 428, 87 So. 2d 835,
the court, in discussing undue influence, had this to say:
"In cases of a conveyance of all of one's property,
where the granter is aged and feeble, only slight
evidence of undue influence is necessary to invalidate the deed."
and in Leuba v. Bailey, 51 Minn. 193, 88 NW 2d 73, the
court said:
"The test of undue influence is not its effect
upon a granter of average intelligence and
strength of character, but is effect upon the
person in question, taking into consideration
his age, intelligence, health, ~nd strength of
character." (emphasis added)
POINT IV
THE EFFECT OF A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP UPON THE VALIDITY
OF A DEED.
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Referring to the effect cf a confidential relationship
and the effect of the validity of a deed, Vol. 23 Am.Jur.
2d Sec. 149, p. 195, states that:
"The existence of a family or a confidential or
quasi-confidential relationship between the
grantor and the grantee in a deed is an
important factor in determining the presence
of undue influence in the execution of the deed,
especially if it appears that the beneficiary
was in honor bound to prefer the interests of the
donor to his own.
It is not the relationship
itself, but rather the ab•.ise of it, that constitutes undue influence. Where a confidential
relationship operates to cause the substitution
of the will of the grantee for that of the grantor
in a deed, the deed may be avoided.
Such relationship exists between .
child,.
principal and agent .

parent and

. Where a confidential relation is shown to
exist between the parties to a deed and where the
grantee, who is the beneficiary, is the dominant
spirit in the transaction, the law raises a presumption of ~ndue influence, or. as is sometimes
said, a deed is prima facie voidable in such a
~·" (emphasis added)
Vol. 23 Am.Jur. 2d Sec. 154, p. 198, further states
that:
"Where a confidential relationship is shown to
exist between the parties to a deed, and where
the grantee, who is the beneficiary, is the dominant
spirit in the transaction, the law raises a presumption of undue influence, or as is sometimes
said, the deed is prima facie voidable in such case.
This imposes upon the grantee, or the party contending that the deed should be upheld, the burden
of repelling that presumption and cf proving the
fairness of the transaction and that the deed
was not obtained by undue influence.
It has been
said that to sustain t~e burden of proof cast
upon him when a presumption of undue influence
exists, the arantee must show in the clearest and
most satisfactory manner that the conveyance is
one which is, in every particular, worthy of
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receiving the sanction of a court of equity.
Stated differently, the presumption of invalidity of a deed due to fiduciary relationship
may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence that the transaction was fair, volun~,
and free from any taint of fraud, coercion, or
overreaching.
Applying these principles, where there is a
presumption of undue influence on the part of a
child, che grantee in a deed, as against his
parent, the grantor, the child (grantee) must
show that the parent acted upon competent and
indeoendent advice of another or must show such
facts as will satisfy the court that the deal~
was at arm's length or that the transaction was
had in the most perfect good faith on his part
and was equitable and just between the parties."
(emphasis added)
POINT V
THE EFFECT OF A MISTAKE ON THE VALIDITY OF A DEED.
Relating to the effect that a mistake has on the
validity of a deed, 23 Am.Jur. 2d, Sec. 155, p. 202,
states that:
"Although a deed in terms expresses the intention
of the parties, if there is a material mistake
as to the property to which those terms apply,
such as to its identity, situation, boundaries,
title, amount, value, and the like, a court of
equity may qrant appropriate relief.
Mistake as to
the quantitY of land in the tract conveyed is
remediable in equity, even to the extent of setting aside the deed.
. . . Relief from mistake in a deed may be granted
in proper cases even though the mistake ~
lateral as distinguished from a mutual mistake,
and a mistake of law may be relieved against when
~ttended by misrepresentations, undue in~luen7e,
misplaced confidence, or some other special circumstances justifying interposition of eauitz."
(emphasis added)
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POINT VI
THE EFFECT OF A UNILATERAL MISTAKE UPON THE VALIDITY OF
A DEED.
23 Am.Jur. 2d, Sec. 156, p. 203, regarding the
effect of a unilateral mistake on the validity cf a deed,
states that:
" . . • It is generally agreed that equitable
cancellation may be decreed on the ground of a
material mistake made by one party only to a
deed, including material mistake as to identity,
situation, boundaries, title, or amount of land
to be conveyed.
A deed may be canceled for a
unilateral mistake on the part of the granter
which renders it inequitable for the grantee to
have the benefit thereof, even though the parties dealt at arm's lehgth and on an equal footing and the grantor was negligent, if his mistake
was not a breach of duty." (emphasis added)
POINT VII
LEGAL ASPECTS FOR DETERMINATION OF WHETHER IT IS A DEED
OR A WILL.
23 Am.Jur. 2d, Sec. 176, p. 221, states that:
. . . So far as general principles are concerned,
wnether an instrument is a deed or ~ill depends
primarily upon the intention of the maker of the
instrument, which may be evidenced by the manner
of execution and the characteristics of the instrument, and, in the final analysis, upon the
manner in which the instrument is to operate.
It is fundamental that while possession or enjoyment of an estate may be deferred, a deed to be
operative must pass a present interest, whereas
an instrument testamentary in character operates
only upon and by reason of the death of the maker,
who, by its execution, parts with no rights and
divest himself of no modicum of his estate .
. . . The general test, therefore, is as to when
the instrument is to take effect as a conveyance
of the property described or of any interest therein." (emphasis added)
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In First Securitv Bank of Utah v. Burgi, 251 P.2d 297,
122 Ut. 445, a case involving a deed and bill of sale executed by a father in favor of a son, said documents being
executed during the father's lifetime but the delivery and
validity of the same being questioned after the father's
death, and the questions being raised as to whether or not
the document which was entitled a deed, was in fact a deed
or a will, the court stated the following:
"The testimony reveals that the deceased clearly
intended that the deed and bill of sale pass the
property to the defendant.
The facts and circumstances, however, support the trial court's finding
that the deceased had no intention to pass title
immediately, but that such deed and bill of sale
were to become operative upon the ·death of the decedent.
Under such circumstances the deed and bill
of sale were clearly testamentary in character,
and intent and were inoperative since they did not
conform to statutory requirements for testamentary
disposition.
In re: Alexander's Estate, 104,
Utah 286, 159 P.2d 432." (emphasis added)
In Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 p.2d 465 (1939),
an earlier case which involved a deed recorded after the
death of granter, it appeared that subsequent to its execution the alleged granter separated from his wife, the
grantee, and that the said granter exercised all the indicia of ownership of the property conveyed, such as redeeming the property from tax sales, mortgaging it with
the knoweldge of the alleged grantee, collecting rents,
paying taxes, etc. and the court held admissible in evidence testimony in the course of these various transactions
that he had repeatedly stated that he was the owner of the
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property and that the deed in question.because of the acts
of ownership on the part of the grantor,was void.
?OINT VIII
FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP
In discussing a fiduciary relationship similar to the
one in this case, the court in Merritt v. Easterly,

(1939)

226 Iowa 514, 284 NW 397, said:
"A grantee who acted as the general agent and
gua!:dian in fact of his aged and infirm aunt
at the time she made deeds of gift to him
has the burden of proving affirmatively that
he took no advantage of her by reason of their
relationship and that she acted voluntarily,
with freedom, intelligence, and full knowledge
of the facts."
In another case similar, the court stated that:
"It is presumed that a deed from an aged grantor
in favor of one who is her farm supervisor and
close friend is the result of fraud and undue
influence because of the confidential relationship and places upon the grantee the burden of
proving the contrary." McNeill v. McNeill, (1943)
223 NC 197, 25 SE 2d 615.
Again, in Jones v. Boothe,

(1960), 270 Ala, 420, 119

Sc. 2d 203, the court said:
"In transactions inter vivas where the parties
stand in confidential relationship and the
grantee who is the beneficiary, is the dominant
spirit in the transaction, the law raises a
presumption of undue influence and casts upon
the grantee the burden of repelling such presumption by satisfactory evidence."
and again, in Hilliard v. Shellabarger,

(1949) 120 Colo.

441, 210 P.2d 441, the court said:
"It is an error of law to place upon the party
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asserting it, the burden of proving fraud and
undue influence where the parties to a deed
stood in a confidential relationship. The burden is on the beneficiary of the transaction to
prove that it was fair, just and equitable."
and in 13 Am.Jur. 2d, Sec. 64, p. 541, it states:
"A party seeking cancellat'con of an instrwnent on
the ground that its execution was brought about
by undue influence, must prove this fact but his
burden of proof is aided by application of a
theory that the existence cf a confidential
relationship raises a presumption of the exercise of undue influence, and the party denying
that the instrument in question was produced by
undue influence has the burden of refuting that
presumption especially where the transaction is
#ithout consideration or is in the nature of a
gift to him.
. . . the preswnption being always against the party
having superior dominant influence or control."
(emphasis added)
Considering the law and the facts as set forth herein,
equity and conscience dictate that the purported deed in
question cannot be a valid one, and the most that can be
said for it is that it is testamentary and ambulatory in
nature and fails

to comply with the applicable statutes

relating to Wills.
Obviously, a confidential and fiduciary relationship
existed between Plaintiff Alice Kesler and her son, the
Defendant David Kesler.

Alice was about 80 years old

when David became her Trustee in Trust of her entire
estate.

Alice testified that David, her Trustee in

Trust, was one person she could rely upon and put her
trust in, yet after David became Trustee in Trust, in
the swnrner of 1971, he had by the summer of 1973, become
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the proud possessor of a swather and bailer valued at
$11,000.00, and a truck valued at about $4,000.00, which
was purchased with Alice's money and for which she makes
no claim.

David has by his acts, attempted to take from

his mother, while acting as her Trustee, an undivided
interest in joint tenancy in her home.
give it to David.

Alice did not

Alice testified that it was her intent

to give her home in Fillmore to David by Will after her
death, but David attempted to take not only the home by
deed, but all her property located in Fillmore, Utah,
plus an additional 640 acres located approximately 40
miles South of Fillmore, near Cove Fort, the additional
Fillmore property and the property near Cove Fort having
never been discussed in any way between the two of them
even as a testamentary gift.
The most important security that elderly have is the
security of knowing that they own their home, which they
have struggled for, bought and paid for, during their
lives.

The security in knowing that no one can take their

home away from them or kick them out of it any time they
desire.

David, however, desires to take that security and

peace of mind from his mother and Truster, in spite of
what her intent was at the time she executed the purported deed, thinking it to be a Will and in spite of what
his mother's intent is now, leaving his mother unsure of
her own home and insecure in the ownership and peaceful
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possession thereof.

He further desires to take from his

mother,while acting as her Trustee, an undivided interest
in her rental units in Fillmore, Utah, which is the main
source of her income, thereby causing her financial insecurity.

Alice's testimony is clear, and David offered

nothing to refute her testimony, with regard to the fact
that the only thing that was to be made a gift to David,
after Alice's death, was her home.

David lived for a

period of a month or more, right in the home of Alice's
while she was having troubles with Joe and Calvin, and
while there he told her how much he liked the arrangement
of her home, and i t was at that time that Alice told
David that she wanted him to have her home after her
death because none of the other members of her family
had indicated that they cared for the arrangement of
the home at any time, and just two days after part of
Alice's troubles with Jee and Calvin were settled, David
ends up with a deed to the property in question.

What

more can be said, other than David took advantage of his
80-year old mother while acting as her Trustee in Trust
and induced her or tricked her into deeding her property
to him by pretending to like her home and pretending to
help and protect her from Joe and Calvin.
David says that the reason Alice gave him

the

property was because he had not received as much as
the other children of Alice and Otto Kesler during his
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lifetime, and that he not only felt justified in taking
the property from Alice as a gift, but now feels that he
is entitled to keep it even after he has heard from Alice's
own lips what her true intentions were.

This argument

of David's might be valid if it was being used against
the other heirs after Alice's death, but to use it
against his own mother, to force her into making a gift to
him during his lifetime, strikes at the very center of
the conscience of the most petrified heart, and equity
should not allow such a deed to stand.
This case differs from most of those cited in this
brief, because Alice is still alive and well and able to
tell the court what her true intent was when she signed
what she thought to be a Will, and her intent is clear
and unequivocal, to-wit:

That David was not to get any

interest in any of the property owned by her until after
she had died and then he was only to get an interest in
her home.
In determining Alice's true intent, the law tells
us that we must look to all the facts and circumstances
surrounding the transaction, both before and after the
date of the questionable deed.

Alice testified she talked

to David about a Will, not a deed.

She testified and

David offered no evidence to contradict her testimony,
that she paid the

rea~

property taxes on the 640 acres,

as well as on her home and the rental units.

She further
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testified that she paid the maintenance and upkeep on
her home and rental units, that she paid for all the
major repairs on everything covered in the deed, that
she maintained insurance on the property at her own cost
and expense, that she collected rents on the rental units
and kept the units rented, that she spent the money received from the rent as she saw fit; that she had the
·(lower and right to sell the property, and in fact did
sell a vacant lot included in the questionable deed located in Fillmore, and all, not one-half, of the funds
received from the sale of the lot went to Alice's bank
account.
David.

None of the proceeds from the sale went to
Alice further testified that she had a right to

mortgage the property.

David, in answer to a question

about who paid the real property taxes, said, "Mama has
always paid her taxes on her property."
This unequivocal, unguarded statement from David
certainly shows David's true intent with regard to the
ownership of the property, to-wit:

Alice owned it and

it was her responsibility to pay the taxes on her property.
David testified that h.e thought he had some right in the
property, but at the present time he did not intend to
exert that right, that he thought that he should wait until
his mother was deceased to exert such a right.

This

testimony certainly shows what David's intent, as well
as his mother's intent was, to-wit:

No property interest
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should pass to David until his mother's death.
To furtner show the true intent of the transaction,
David testified that he never reported any income, either
Federal or State, on his tax returns at the time the purported deed was made.
meant to be a gift.

The reason given was that it was
Yet, David did not, while acting as

Trustee for Alice, cause to be filed a gift tax return for
her, thereby evidencing the fact that the transaction
was not to be presently effective, but that the property
covered by the purported warranty deed was in total to
remain in and be a part of Alice Kesler's estate, up until the time of her death.

Note also that Alice and

David, at all times, had legal counsel to advise them,
but none advised them with regard to taxes and the effect
of a joint tenancy warranty deed.
Let's look now for a moment at the legal advice that
Alice got regarding the effect of a joint tenancy warranty
deed.

Eldon Eliason testified that he refused to give

any advice with regard to the deed, that he would have
nothing to do with the preparation of the same.

His ex-

cuse being a conflict of interest because he drafted the
Trust.

Fred Finlinson, the attorney who prepared the

purported deed, really couldn't remember specifically
what he told Alice and David, but thought he advised her
about joint tenancy deeds in general, but when asked
specifically if he told Alice that she could not get her
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property back, he replied that he did not think that the
subject came up.

Certainly it would be Mr. Finlinson's

responsiblity to bring such a subject up.

Mr. Finlinson

further testified that he did not advise her that she was
parting with a present interest in her property, to-wit:
her home, and certainly Alice would have recalled if Finlinson would have said to her, "Hey, Alice, you're giving
one-half of your home to David right now, today.

Do

you want that now, or wait until after your death?". Obviously, the question was never asked.

It is a compliment

to say that Alice received even poor advice, at best.

The

law is clear that Alice, when making a gift of her property
in joint tenancy or otherwise, should receive and is entitled
to receive, competent independent legal advice which is understandable to her and this is especially true where the
Grantee in the deed is to be the beneficiary thereof and
where the Grantee is a son and a Trustee in Trust holding
a confidential and fiduciary relationship with the Granter.
Finlinson testified that a Will was never discussed,
and that he never inquired about the balance of her estate
and never advised her about a life estate or any alternative
that she might take other than making a warranty deed
with regard to her property.

Finlinson did, however, in-

dicate that he was knowledgeable of her problems with
Calvin and Joe and it is further interesting to note that
the only written memorandum that Finlinson made with regard
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to what transpired in his office on the date the alleged
deed was prepared by him, related to Alice's problems
with Joe and Calvin, which is precisely what Alice testified
that she went to Mr. Finlinson to talx about, to-wit:
the validity of a joint tenancy deed between Alice and her
husband, Otto Kesler, which had just been determined and
upheld by the lower court two days before David got his
parsimonious hands on the putative warranty deed.

David

offered no direct testimony to controvert what Alice said
her true intent was at the time the reputed warranty deed
was signed by her, to-wit: to make some kind of a gift to
David to take effectonly after Alice's death.

Neither

could David provide the court with any extrinsic evidence
to show that her intent was different than Alice testified
it was.
David, when he accepted the position as Trustee for
Alice, owed her the highest duty required by law, equity
and conscience - to avoid even the mere semblence of overreaching or unfair treatment, and David could not at trial
show by his own testimony or by the testimony of others
who he called to testify on his behalf, that the deed made
between he and his mother creating the joint tenancy was
what she intended, or that it was a fair transaction or
that she was independently and properly advised.

In fact,

David took Alice to see Attorney Finlinson.
The law presumes the existence of fraud, overreaching,
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and undue influence where such a relationship of trust and
confidence exists between two people, as it existed between
Alice and her son, and Alice testified and David did not
deny the fact, that she signed papers in her own home
which David brought to her.

In fact she testified that

the document in which David claims a one-half interest in
Alice's property was misrepresented to her by David in
that she thought she was signing a Will and that the
part of the document which she signed which showed it's
title, to-wit: Warranty Deed, was never shown to her at
the time that she signed said document.

She testified

further, however, that it really didn't make any difference
because she trusted David and would have signed any document which was put before her by David for her signature.
This is the very essence of the law which requires the
shifting of the burden from the Plaintiff-Appellant-Grantor
to the Defendant-Respondent-Grantee, to show that the
transaction was beyond question a fair, equitable and
conscienable transaction, and David certainly failed to
prove such in the instant case.
Alice testified unequivocally that her intent was to
sign a Will leaving her home, only, to David after her
death, but in fact the doucment she signed, thinking it to
be a Will, turned out to be a warranty deed.

The law is

clear that a unilateral mistake on the part of the Granter
as to the nature of the document that she is signing is
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grounds to void the document, in this instance, the deed.
The law further allows the recision of a deed in cases
where the granter makes a unilateral mistake as to the
amount of property conveyed or as to the particular property conveyed.

Again, in the instant case,

~here

was no

intent on the part of the Granter, Alice, to convey any
property but in any event, there was not even any intent
to execute a Will leaving any property to David after Alice's
death, except her house, and certainly if the document
which she intended to sign had been a Will, she would have
been entitled to revoke that gift during her lifetime.

Here

again, Alice relief upon David to obtain the property description to put in the Will, and she had a right to rely
upon him because he was her Trustee and he failed her.
And even if the document in question,

(and we do not

acknowledge for one second that she intended to sign a
deed) , had been a deed wherein Alice intended to convey
only her home in joint tenancy to David, the deed should
still be set aside because of the unilateral mistake on
the part of Alice thinking that the document covered only
her home.
Alice further testified that she had difficulty in
ready even the big words on the documents, to-wit: Warranty
Deed, at the top of the page, and that she could not read
the fine print in which the description was made.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-34-

In any

event, even if she could have read the descriptions, she
could not recognize the same and relied upon David entirely
to make an honest and fair deal according to her intent.
Thus, the unilateral mistake, as to the nature of the
document and the amount of property to be conveyed,
coupled with the relationship of the parties being confidential and fiduciary in nature, is further grounds for
setting aside the putative deed.

CONCLUSION
There was no intent on the part of the Granter, Alice
Kesler, at the time that she executed the document entitled
"Warranty Deed", to pass an immediate present interest in
the title to her real estate in question.

Her intent was

to make a testamentary gift of her home only to David to
take effect at the time of her death, and not before,
and therefore the deed is void as such because of a lack
of intent to pass a present interest in the property and
thus delivery of the same is ineffective and incomplete.
The document is further void as a Will because it fails
to comply with the applicable statutes relating to Wills.
The purported deed is further void for the reason of
fraud and undue influence exerted upon Alice by David while
acting in a confidential and fiduciary relationship with
her, thereby shifting the burden from the Plaintiff-Appellant Alice to the Defendant-Respondent David to prove that
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the transaction was unquestionably a fair one, which burden the Defendant-Respondent failed to meet.
The deed is further void for the reason that a unilateral
mistake was made on the part of the Granter Alice, with regard not only to the nature of the doucment which she was
signing, to-wit: her intent was to make a Will, not a deed,
and also as to the amount of property whcih was to be included in the document whch she was signing was in excess
ofthe amount which Alice intended.
From the foregoing facts and law, it obviously appears
that consicence, equity, and fair and honest dealings dictate and require that the deed in question be declared void
and of no validity whatsoever and that Alice Kesler, the
Plaintiff-Appellant herein be restored to the ownership of
her property as described in the purported deed and that
David Kesler, her son and former Trustee, be required to
return to her by execution of a warranty deed, all of her
property which he now holds a joint interest in with her,
pursuant to the purported deed in

ques~ion,

and that said

acts on David's part should be consummated forthwith, and
~he

judgment declaring said deeds valid should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted

z -

BYRON L. STUBBS
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